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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAHf 
Plainti ff-Respondent, 
v. 
THOMAS M. SPEER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. CR 86-0112 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Thomas M. Speerf appeals from the conviction 
of the crime of aggravated burglary and aggravated assault, and 
the denial of the Defendant's motion for a new trial following 
said conviction. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant was tried before the Honorable Judge 
J. Dennis Frederick and convicted by a jury on April 25, 1985. 
He was committed to the Utah State Prison on May, 20, 1985, but 
granted a stay of commitment pending his Motion for New Trial. 
The Motion for New Trial was heard and denied on January 8, 1986. 
The Defendant filed his appeal from the denial of his motion on 
January 30, 1986. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant seeks to have his convictions of 
aggravated burglary and aggravated assault vacated and to have 
the matter remanded for new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the time of the alleged crime, Appellant was 
estranged from his wife Sharon Speer, Complainant in this matter, 
the two were living apart, and involved in a divorce proceeding. 
Following the departure of the Speerfs children to 
school on February 13, 1985, the Appellant came to the residence 
of Sharon Speer. He had in his possession a shotgun. He 
indicated that he and Mrs. Speer were "going to spend the day 
together". Evidence at trial indicated that Mr. Speer intended 
to commit suicide, and the gun was for this purpose. 
During the time that Mr. Speer occupied the house with 
Mrs. Speer, several struggles between the two ensued. Mrs. Speer 
testified that Mr. Speer had grabbed her and yanked her hair and 
choked and assaulted her, but had not utilized a weapon in any of 
these acts. Mr. Speer was finally taken into custody following a 
call from a friend of Mrs. Speer's who became concerned and 
called the police. Upon the arrival of the police, Mr. Speer was 
taken into custody without incident. Mrs. Speer was not injured. 
The Defendant was bound over to the District Court and 
arraigned before the Honorable Timothy Hanson. A request for 
bail was denied by Judge Hanson on April 17 and the matter was 
set for a trial date of April 23. On April 23, this matter was 
heard by the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick. No Order changing 
the Judge assignment or continuing the trial was made on the 
record. 
At trial, Mr. Speer took the stand as a witness during 
the defense phase. In response to cross-examination questions 
from Counsel for the State, the Defendant denied that he hated 
his son Eric, that the Defendant had threatened to kill Eric if 
he ever stood up to Mr. Speer again, or that he had threatened to 
kill Eric or his mother. (Transcript of Criminal Proceedings, 
April 24 and 25, 1985, at pp. 30, 33, 47-48. Hereinafter ffT.R.ff) 
Mr. Speer also testified that he had not threatened or physically 
harmed his sons. Id. 
Upon the Prosecution's asking the Defendant if his 
discipline of his sons included breaking their arms, counsel for 
the Defendant objected and the Court sustained the objection. 
T.R. at 48. Eric Speer and Erron Speer, the Defendant's sons, 
and Stacey Lee Speer, the Defendant's daughter, were later called 
as rebuttal witnesses. Both Eric and Erron were questioned 
concerning Mr. Speer's alleged physical abuse of them. 
Defendant's counsel tv/ice objected to the questions as 
collateral, but the Court overruled both objections, stating that 
the questions went to the credibility of the Defendant who denied 
physically abusing either of his sons. T.R. at 181, 193. 
At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence, the 
jury was instructed on the offenses of aggravated assault; 
aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, burglary and 
kidnapping. No instruction on simple assault as a lesser 
included offense to aggravated assault was given to the jury, A 
verdict of guilty was subsequently entered as to the charges of 
aggravated burglary and aggravated assault, and a verdict of not 
guilty was rendered as to kidnapping. 
At the time of sentencing, the Court enhanced 
Defendant's sentence by one year in accordance with Section 76-3-
203, Utah Code Ann. (1953). 
The Defendant was originally charged in two cases: the 
above referenced matter; and a less serious matter in which the 
Defendant was charged with having entered the home of his then 
estranged wife and destroying her clothing. The second matter 
was set for trial first and would have been resolved before the 
trial in this case. However, the matter was continued by mutual 
agreement of counsel for the reason that both felt trial in the 
instant matter would be dispositive of the second matter. The 
Defendant himself did not participate in such stipulation for 
indefinite continuance of the second matter, and learned of the 
continuance only after the fact. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMFNT 
Defendant Thomas Speer asserts six points of error in 
his appeal from the denial of his motion for a new trial. These 
six points of error - the allowance of improper and highly 
prejudicial impeachment testimony; the Trial Court's violation of 
its own rules and procedures in reassigning the case; denial of 
effective assistance of counsel; failure to give a lesser 
included offense jury instruction; prosecutorial misconduct; and 
erroneous jury instruction on intent required for conviction -
individually and collectively establish that the Defendant was 
denied a fair and impartial trial on the charges of aggravated 
assault and kidnapping. Such errors were prejudicial to 
Mr. Speer's defense in that a different verdict would likely have 
resulted had the errors not occurred. 
ARGUMENT 
I. HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL AND IMPROPER IMPEACHMENT 
TESTIMONY WAS ALLOWED 
The general rule of evidence, as followed by this 
Court, is that the answers of a witness upon cross examination on 
any irrelevant or collateral matter is conclusive and binding, 
and the witness may not be contradicted or impeached upon any 
immaterial or collateral matter or issue. State v. Mitchell, 
571 P.2d 1351, 1355 (Utah 1977), citing Davenport v. State, 519 
P.2d 452, 454 (Ala. 1974); State v. Jiron. 489 P.2d 109 (1971). 
Neither is it permissible to impeach the credibility of 
a witness by injecting irrelevant and immaterial issues and then 
contradicting them thereon. 98 C.J.S. Witnesses, Section 633 
P. 652. Even though credibility of all witnesses is an issue, 
specific incidents relating to character and not related to the 
matter in evidence may not be used as the basis for impeachment. 
Bullock v. Ungricht, 538 P.2d 190 (1975); Utah Rules of Evidence, 
Rule 608(b) ("Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for 
the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other 
than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be 
proved by extrinsic evidence.") 
Thus, the cross-examiner is denied the use of other 
witnesses or the offering of extrinsic evidence to contradict 
this type of testimony. State v. Jiron, 489 P.2d 109 (1971); 
State v. Harp. 534 P.2d 46 (Wash. 1975). 
Whether a matter pursued for the purpose of impeachment 
is irrelevant or collateral turns on whether the fact could have 
been shown in evidence for any purpose independent of 
contradiction, i.e., whether the cross-questioning party would 
have been entitled to prove the matter as part of his case in 
chief. public service co,rof Oklahoma v, Bleak, 656 P.2d 600, 
612 (Ariz. 1982). 2 Wharton's Criminal Evidence Sec. 467. 
The State's case in chief against Mr. Speer was based 
upon alleged kidnapping, burglary and assault committed on 
Mrs. Speer on February 13, 1985. During the alleged incident, 
the children were not present. Furthermore, the alleged prior 
physical abuse of Eric and Erron Speer by the Defendant did not 
constitute a matter which the State would have been entitled to 
prove as a part of it's case in chief. Consequently, the 
testimony of Eric and Erron Speer was on a collateral matterr not 
a proper matter for impeachment. 
* * * when impeaching a witness the relevancy 
of the impeaching evidence must be clear, must 
not raise collateral issues and must be 
directed only at the witness1 credibility and 
not at the witness1 moral character, 
(Citation omitted). 
Here the evidence adduced * * * was irrelevant 
to * * * the offense [he] was charged with. 
People v. Diaz, 644 P.2d 71 (Colo. 1982). 
Where evidence which is irrelevant or collateral to the 
issues in controversy is admitted and has a tendency to prejudice 
the trier-of-fact, such error is fatal to a conviction. This 
rule applies even though there might of been sufficient relevant 
evidence to sustain the verdict. 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence 
Sec. 164. 
The nature of the testimony of Eric and Erron Speer was 
highly prejudicial to the Defendant. The issues in controversy-
concerned an assault charge, and the testimony of Eric and Erron 
Speer concerned threats of assault by the Defendant upon third 
persons and may have lead the jury to think the Defendant more 
likely to have committed the assaultive conduct claimed. 
Furthermore, the charges of child abuse are per se 
inflammatory and have a prejudicial tendency. 
Consequently, the admission of the testimony by Eric 
and Erron Speer constituted reversible error. 
II. THE COURT VIOLATED ITS OWN RULES AND PROCEDURES IN 
CHANGING JUDGES WITHOUT A HEARING OR COURT ORDER 
After being bound over to the District Court, this case 
was originally assigned to the Honorable Timothy Hansen, one of 
the Judges of the Third District Court. On April 17, 1985, Judge 
Hansen entered an order denying bail and setting the trial date. 
Pre-trial motions by the Defendant were heard and ruled upon by 
Judge Hansen, including a motion for the Defendant's release to 
pretrial services. Judge Hanson rendered his ruling on this 
motion only six days prior to the trial. Yet when the scheduled 
trial was called before the Third District Court, Judge 
Fredericks presided. No order changing the Judge assignment or 
continuing the trial appears in the record. 
Rule 3.4 of the Rules of Practice in District Courts 
provides in part: 
(b) Criminal cases that have been set for trial 
or hearing shall not be continued or reassigned 
except upon order of the court. 
The Defendant, in a series of pro se motions, has 
challenged the bias of the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick. 
(Record on Appeal at 137-38, 198-200.) With no order reassigning 
the case, it should have stayed before Judge Hansen and should 
not have been reassigned without the opportunity of the Defendant 
to be heard on the subject. To do so was a denial of due process 
and should result in a new trial before the properly assigned 
Judge. 
III. DEFENDANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
IN THAT DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL DISREGARDED DEFENDANT'S 
DIRECTIONS IN PREPARING HIS DEFENSE 
Disciplinary Rule 7-101 of the Code of Professional 
Ethics for the Utah State Bar Association provides in part: 
(A) A lawyer shall not intentionally, 
(1) fail to seek the lawful objectives 
of his client through reasonably 
available means permitted by law and 
these disciplinary rules except as 
provided by Disciplinary Rule 7-10KB). 
• « • • 
(3) Prejudice or damage his client 
during the course of the professional 
relationship except as required under 
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B). 
(B) in his representation of a client, a lawyer may: 
(1) Where permissible, exercise his 
professional judgment 'to waive or fail 
to assert a right or position of his 
client. 
Section 78-51-26(9) Utah Code Ann. (1953) requires all 
attorneys to comply with the rules of the Utah State Bar, 
including its Disciplinary Rules as enacted by the Association 
and Approved by the Utah Supreme Court. 
These rules, in effect, recognize the division of 
control between an attorney and the client he represents. Any 
authority which the attorney has is conferred upon him by the 
client. Such authority is further limited by the attorneyfs 
ethical obligation to consult with and follow the directions of 
the client with regard to substantive rights of the client. 
While a retained attorney is clothed with apparent authority to 
resolve certain ancillary and procedural matters with regards to 
litigation matters, such retention does not empower the attorney 
to "impair the client's substantial rights". Blanton v. 
Womancare, Inc., 696 P.2d 645, 650 (Cal. 1985). For example, an 
attorney may not stipulate to a matter which would eliminate an 
essential defense, agree to the entry of a default judgment, 
stipulate that only nominal damages may be awarded, waive 
findings so that no appeal can be made, etc. without first 
consulting with his client and allowing the latter to make the 
final choice. Id. (citations omitted.) 
Such decisions differ from the routine and tactical 
decisions which have been called "procedural" both in the degree 
to which they affect the client's interest, and in the degree to 
v/hich they involve matters of judgment which extend beyond 
technical competence so that any client would be expected to 
share in the making of them. 
Nevertheless, an attorney acts as assistant for his 
client, and not as a master. The language and spirit of the 
Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as well as Article 1, 
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution speak of legal counsel as an 
aid to a willing defendant, like other defense tools, and not an 
organ of the state interposed between an unwilling defendant and 
his constitutional rights. State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 17, 91 (Utah 
1981) citing to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820, 95 
S.Ct. 2525, 2533, 45 L.Fd.2d 562 (1975). To compel one charged 
with grievous crimes to undergo a trial with the assistance of an 
attorney with whom he has become embroiled in irreconcilable 
conflict is to deprive him of the effective assistance of any 
counsel whatsoever. Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166, 1170 (9th 
Cir. 1970) cited in State v. Wood, supra at 92. 
In determining whether a conviction should be reversed 
on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, the following 
criteria must be established by an appellant before the Utah 
Supreme Court: (1) A demonstrable reality of inadequate 
representation, as opposed to a speculative matter; (2) The error 
assigned was not simply the lawyerfs legitimate exercise of 
choi'ce in trial strategy; (3) The deficiency in performance of 
counsel was prejudicial, and without the error a different 
verdict would likely have resulted. State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 
203, 204 (Utah 1976) cited in Codianna v. Morris 660 P.2d 1101 
(Utah 1983) . 
This Court has examined such a claim with regard to the 
failure of defense counsel to request certain jury instructions 
in the Codianna case. In that case, the court required that the 
instruction, if given, would have likely resulted in a different 
verdict. Failure to request a pertinent instruction could be 
evidence of faulty performance by counsel where evidentiary 
support for the instruction was compelling. Codianna v. Morris, 
660 P.2d at 1113. As set forth more fully in point four of this 
brief, the Court failed to give a lesser included jury 
instruction on simple assault and burglary. Furthermore counsel 
for the Defendant failed to request such instruction dispite the 
evidentiary support for the same. Had the instruction been 
given, a different verdict would have been the likely result. 
The Defendant forsaw that the alleged impropriety 
between his son and an older woman would be an issue in the case. 
He testified about it and it was addressed on rebuttal. It 
became an issue in the closing arguments of counsel. The 
defendant wanted witnesses called on the subject but his counsel 
refused. Mr. Speerfs credibility became a key element of the 
case, and the inability of his defense counsel to address the 
issue by calling the desired witnesses was prejudicial to the 
Defendant. 
Mr. Speer was originally charged in two cases. The 
instant case and a less serious matter in which the defendant was 
charged with having entered the home of the victim and destroyed 
her clothing. The less serious matter was set first and would 
have been resolved before the trial in this case had it not been 
continued. No hearing before the court was held. According to 
the affidavit of the prosecutor the case was continued by mutual 
agreement of counsel because they felt the trial in the instant 
matter would be dispositive of that charge. (Record on Appeal at 
205-06.) While this may well be true, counsel had no authority 
to make that decision without the permission of his client. It 
may have saved a trial, but it may also have injured the client. 
As it turned outf the incident involving the destruction of the 
clothing became an important part of the trial that was allowed 
over the objection of the defense to show whether the defendant 
was welcome in the home or not. 
The attitude of counsel with respect to decision making 
in the conduct of the case is further illustrated by the motion 
to withdraw following trial. In his final pleading of the case 
Mr. VanSciver cites as a reason for the withdrawal the defendants 
interference with his "unfettered discretion". (Record on Appeal 
at 209.) 
Each of the foregoing instances demonstrates a reality 
of inadequate representation by trial counsel for the Defendant. 
The failure of counsel to request a specific jury instruction on 
a lesser included offense, refusal to call crucial witnesses, and 
entering into stipulations affecting the substantive rights of 
the Defendant without his consent all constitute instances of 
inadequate representation. The Defendant and his counsel were 
consistently at odds as to the conduct of his defense. While 
counsel is granted leeway in the conduct of his trial strategy, 
the consistent disregard of Mr. Speerfs concerns took the 
representation beyond mere exercise in trial strategy. Finally, 
without these errors, a different verdict would likely have 
resulted. The result of a lesser included jury instruction alone 
could likely have resulted in a different verdict. 
Consequently, the record evinces all three criteria 
which must be established by an appellant in order to obtain a 
reversal on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
IV. THE COURT FAILED TO GIVE A LESSER INCLUDED JURY 
INSTRUCTION ON SIMPLE ASSAULT AND BURGLARY 
Under section 77-35-21 (e) of Utah Code Ann. (1953) a 
jury may return a verdict of guilty for the offense charged or 
for any offense necessarily included in the offense charged. 
Likewise, section 76-1-402(5) provides: 
If the district court on motion after verdict 
or judgment, or an appellate court on appeal 
or certiorari, shall determine that there is 
insufficient evidence to support a conviction 
for the offense charged but that there is 
sufficient evidence to support a conviction 
for an included offense and the trier of fact 
necessarily found every fact required for 
conviction of that included offense, the 
verdict or judgment of conviction may be set 
aside or reversed and a judgment of 
conviction entered for the included offense, 
without necessity of a new trial, if such 
relief is sought by the defendant. 
This requirement of a necessarily included offense 
being included in the charged offense is made for the protection 
of the defendant. United States v. Whitaker, 447 F.2d 314, 320 
(D.C.Cir. 1971), cited in State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 155 (Utah 
1983). By having the jury instructed regarding a lesser included 
offense, the defendant is afforded the full benefit of the 
reasonable doubt standard. Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 
205, 212-13, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 1997-98, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973) cited 
in State v. Baker, 671 P.2d at 157. Where one of the elements of 
the offense charged remains in doubt, but the defendant is 
plainly guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its 
doubts in favor of conviction. Id. Thus, the inclusion of a 
lesser included offense provides the jury with a "third option" -
the choice of conviction of a lesser offense rather than 
conviction of the greater offense or acquittal - and gives the 
defendant a fuller benefit from the reasonable doubt standard. 
State v. Baker, 671 P.2d at 157. 
The Utah Code provides that a trial Court shall not be 
obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense 
unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the 
included offense. Section 76-1-402(4) Utah Code Ann. (1953). 
Section 76-1-402(3)(a) defines "included offense" as, among other 
things, an offense which is established by proof of the same or 
less than all of the facts required to establish the commission 
of the offense charged. Assault is therefore definitionally an 
included offense in Aggravated Assault, Sections 76-5-102, -103, 
Utah Code Ann. (1953) , and Burglary is an included offense in 
Aggravated Burglary, Sections 76-6-202, - 203, Utah Code Ann. 
(1953) . 
The standard for a lesser included offense jury 
instruction at the request of a criminal defendant, as applied to 
the immediate case, requires an evidentiary basis for the 
acquittal on the more serious charge and a conviction on the 
lesser charge. This analysis requires the appellate court to 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant; 
it is not the appellate Court's role to weigh the evidence, but 
to determine if the evidence offered would permit a jury to find 
the defendant innocent of the harsher charge and guilty of the 
lesser charge. State v. Oldroyd. 685 P.2d 551, 555 (Utah 1984). 
Put another way, "if there is rational evidence looking at the 
evidence as a whole that would put an element of the crime in 
dispute the lesser included offense instruction should be given." 
Id* 
In the Oldroyd casef the evidence put in dispute the 
defendant's intent in pointing an allegedly unloaded weapon at 
the arresting officer. Thus a conviction of aggravated assault 
was reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. Id. at 
556. Likewise in the immediate case, the defendant's intent in 
brandishing a weapon in Mrs. Speer's home was placed in doubt. 
Mr. Speer testified that his intent was to commit suicide - not 
to threaten or harm his ex-wife. Taking this evidence and 
considering it in the light most favorable to the Defendant, one 
of the key elements of an aggravated assault charge is in dispute 
- the criminal intent. Such dispute provides an evidentiary 
basis for the Defendant's acquittal on the charge of aggravated 
assault, and would also go towards conviction on the lesser 
charge of simple assault. Consequently, defendant was entitled to 
the lesser included offense jury instruction. 
Section 77-35-19(c) Utah Code Ann. provides that no 
party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission 
therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is 
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and 
the ground of his objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure 
to object, error may be assigned to instructions in order to 
avoid a manifest injustice. 
In the immediate case, defense counsel failed to 
request a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of 
simple assault. This failure is assigned as an error on the part 
of defense counsel in regards to the argument of ineffective 
assistance of counsel set forth above. Not withstanding defense 
counsel's failure to offer such jury instruction or object to the 
courts exclusion of such instruction, manifest and justice can be 
avoided only by assigning error to the jury instructions for 
failure to include such lesser included offense instruction. 
V. THE PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN MISCONDUCT IN HIS 
CROSS EXAMINATION AND CLOSING ARGUMENT 
Reversible error is found where there is a reasonable 
likelihood that an improper question by a prosecutor in a 
criminal case so prejudiced the jury that in its absence there 
might have been a different result. State V. Hodges, 517 P.2d 
1322 (Utah 1974), cited in State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 (Utah 
1982). The analysis of such issue on appeal must necessarily 
turn on the nature of the statements and their relationship to 
the evidence introduced at trial. State v. Fisher, 680 P.2d 35, 
36 (Utah 1984). Where there exists ample independent evidence 
supporting the verdict rendered, then the purportedly prejudicial 
statements of the prosecutor do not constitute sufficient cause 
for reversible error. See Id* at 37 (analyzing prejudicial effect 
of prosecutorfs opening statement); State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 
1042, 1048 (Utah 1984). 
Howeverf where a prosecutor has injected testimony 
concerning the Defendant being implicated in other crimes, and 
where it appears that the main purpose and effect was to disgrace 
the defendant in the minds of the jury, then convictions have 
been reversed by this court. State v. Hodges, 517 P. 2d 1322 
(Utah 1974) citing State v. Dickson, 12 Utah 2d 8, 361 P.2d 412 
and State v. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 383 P.2d 407 (1963). 
The following areas were raised by prosecution during 
the course of the trial. Despite the objections of the 
Defendant, these matters were allowed into evidence. The 
Prosecution here explored, over the objection of the Defendant, a 
separate matter which was charged but not resolved in another 
case. This incident involved alleged criminal conduct directed 
toward the victim in December preceding this incident. Tr. 22-
29. 
The Prosecution also explored an alleged conversation 
between the Defendant and one Jeanie Hessling that also occurred 
in December, This conversation involved the issue of the 
defendant's belief that the parties1 son was having an affair 
with Ms. Hessling, a substantially older woman. Tr. 29-33, 52-56. 
This was offered only for the purpose of attacking the 
defendant's reputation, to make him look threatening and 
overreactive. It is noteworthy that Ms. Hessling was never 
called to testify. 
The Prosecution brought up the personal living 
arrangements of the Defendant to show he was living with another 
woman, although not divorced from the victim. Tr. 42-43. 
And as indicated above, he accused the Defendant of 
having abused his children. Tr.47-49. 
The attack on the defendant was further compounded by 
the actions of the prosecutor during closing argument where he 
misstated the law with respect to the charge of assault. During 
his closing argument the prosecutor argued that no serious 
physical injury need be caused or attempted so long as any 
physical injury which he defined as any "impairment or 
discomfort" caused by another. Transcript of closing argument 
page 11-12. 
The entire line of pursuit was designed to attack the 
Defendant, disgrace him before the jury, and make him look like a 
person more capable of committing the crime charged. It was not 
directed at his credibility, but at his reputation and character 
which was an improper subject of pursuit and should have been 
prohibited. State v. Hodges, 517 P.2d 1322. 
VI. THE COURT ERRED IN CHARGING THE JURY THAT 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT COULD BE FOUND ON THE 
BASIS OF RECKLESS CONDUCT 
A person commits aggravated assault if he commits 
assault as defined in section 76-5-102, Utah Code Ann. (1953) and 
he intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another, or he 
uses a deadly weapon or such means or force likely to produce 
death or serious bodily injury. Section 76-5-103, Utah Code Ann, 
(1953) (emphasis added). 
A personfs conduct is "intentional" where he acts with 
intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or 
to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or 
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. By contrast, 
a person engages in conduct "recklessly" when he is aware of but 
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must 
be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a 
gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person 
would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the 
actor's standpoint. Section 76-2-103, Utah Code Ann. (1953). 
To support a conviction under Section 76-5-103(1) (a) , the state 
must prove the accused intentionally caused serious bodily 
injury, viz., that he had a specific intent to inflict serious 
bodily injury on the victim, and such injuries were, in fact, 
caused by the assault. State in Interest of Besendorfer, 568 
P.2d 742, 744 (Utah 1977). Where the evidence of such specific 
intent is lacking, and the victim sustained no serious bodily 
injury, then the defendants conviction for aggravated assault 
will be reversed. Id. See also State v. Peck, 542 P.2d 1084 
(Utah 1975). 
Subsection nb" of section 76-5-103, by contrast, 
requires a general intent; i.e. an awareness of what is done as 
opposed to requiring a specific intent to cause a certain harm or 
event. State v. Howell, 554 P.2d 1326, 1328 (Utah 1976), cited 
in Besendorfer, supra at 744. 
The evidence in the Record on Appeal establishes that 
the Defendant had with him a shotgun. However, the evidence 
does not establish that Mr. Speer threatened Mrs. Speer with the 
gun or in any way used it to assault her. Rather, it became 
apparent under the evidence that Mr. Speer intended to use the 
shotgun for a suicide attempt. Consequently, no deadly weapon or 
such means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily 
injury were involved in Mr. Speer's assault on his estranged 
wife. 
Had Mr. Speer utilized a deadly weapon or force upon 
his wife, then the standard of general intent would have implied 
to his offense. However, such was not the case, and the only 
applicable standard was that of section 76-5-102 (a), specific 
intent. 
The trial court instructed the jury that it could 
convict the Defendant of aggravated assault if it found his 
conduct to have been reckless. As set forth above, such 
instruction was erroneous and prejudiced the Defendants case. 
The evidence of specific intent on the Defendant's part was 
lacking from the record, and Mrs. Speer sustained no serious 
bodily injury. Consequentlyr the Defendant's conviction for 
aggravated assault should be reversed. 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT ENHANCED THE SENTENCE OF THE DEFENDANT 
WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE TO THE DEFENDANT. ' 
At the time of the sentencing, the Court enhanced the 
sentence of the Defendant by one year in accordance with U.C.A. 
76-3-203. The information contained no reference to the 
enhancement potential, no special finding was made by the jury 
with respect to the use of a firearm, nor was the defendant given 
any notice that such a finding was under consideration by the 
judge until he had actually enhanced the sentence. 
Fundamental due process as guaranteed by the 14th 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States requires that 
a defendant have reasonable notice of the charges against him and 
reasonable opportunity to defend against such charges. This 
includes the opportunity to defend against additional findings 
that may result in increase of the sentence. 
The Defendant cannot properly contest potential charges 
of which he has not been advised. He should not be subjected to 
this enhancement where he was given no fair opportunity to meet 
the charge prior to the Court's finding. 
This Court has determined that the Defendant must be 
put on notice of the potential use of the enhancement statute, 
either by its being plead in the Information or by the 
Information's inclusion of a charge that a firearm was used in 
the commission of the crime. State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992 (1978). 
This requirement for notice is further aggravated in 
circumstances where the alleged conduct may or may not have 
involved the use of a firearm depending on the focus of the jury. 
In such a circumstance, unless the information presented to the 
Jury is clear in its contents of a firearm as an element of the 
crime, or the jury is asked to make such a finding, the trial 
judge should not go behind the jury verdict and make a finding 
that may be contrary to the jury finding. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Defendant's conviction should be reversed and the 
matter remanded to the District Court for hearing before the 
assigned trial judge. 
At the retrial, the Prosecution should be prohibited 
from trying cases other than the one before the bar and not be 
allowed to delve into alleged bad conduct of the Defendant 
unrelated to the charges in the information. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this // day of June, 1986. 
JEROME H/?W)ONEY 
Attorney for Defendan 
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SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and 
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
ARTICLE 1 SECTION 12 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature 
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, 
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him, to have comnpulsory process to compel the attendance 
of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense 
is alleged to have been committted, and the right to appeal in 
all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final 
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the 
rights herein guaranteed* The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testiify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953) 
SECTION 76-1-402(3)(a) 
A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the 
offense charged but may not be convicted of both the offense 
charged and the included offense. An offense is so includedd 
when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all 
the facts required to establish the commission of the offense 
charged, 
SECTION 76-1-402(4) 
The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with 
respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis 
for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and 
convicting him of the included offense. 
SECTION 76-1-402(5) 
If the district court on motion after verdict of judgment, 
or an appellate court on appeal of certiorari, shall determine 
that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for 
the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to 
support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of 
fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that 
included offense, the verdict of judgment of conviction may be 
set aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for 
the included offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such 
relief is sought by the defendant. 
SECTION 76-5-102 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) An attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another; or 
(b) A threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force 
or violence , to do bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
SECTION 76-5-103 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits 
assault as defined in section 76-5-102 and: 
(a) He intentionally causes serious bodily injury to 
another; or 
(b) He uses a deadly weapon or such means or force 
likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) Aggravated assault is a felony of the third degree. 
SECTION 76-6-202 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains 
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent 
to commit a felony of theft or commit an assault on any person, 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was 
committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the 
second degree. 
SECTION 76-6-203 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in 
attempting, committing, or fleeing from a burglary, the actor or 
another participant in the crime: 
(a) Causes physical injury to any person who is not a 
participant in the crime; or 
(b) Uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous 
of deadly weapon against any person who is not a participant in 
the crime; or 
(c) Is armed wih a deadly weapon or possesses or 
attempts to use any explosive or deadly weapon. 
(2) Aggravated burglary is a felony of the first degree. 
SECTION 77-35-19(c), RULE 19 OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - Jury 
Instructions 
Mo party may assign as error any portion of the charge or 
omission therefrom unles he objects thereto before the jury is 
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and 
the ground of his objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure 
to object, error may be assigned to instructions in order to 
avoid a manifest injustice. 
SECTION 77-35-2KE), RULE 21 OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - Verdict 
The jury may return a verdict of guilty to the offense 
charged or to any offense necessarily included in the offense 
charged or an attempt to commit either the offense charged or an 
offense necessarily included therein. 
SECTION 78-51-26(9), JUDICIAL CODE - Duties of Attorneys and 
Counselors 
It is the duty of an attorney and counselor . . . 
(9) to comply with all duly approved rules and regulations 
prescribed by the board of commissioners of the Utah state bar 
and to pay the fees provided by law. 
LOCAL RULE OF PRACTICE 3,4 IN THE DISTRICT COURTS 
AND CIRCUIT COURTS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
(a) All motions for continuance of trail or hearing shall 
be made orally in open court or in writing, and shall state the 
reasons therefore together with proof that notice of the motions 
has been duly served upon the the adverse party. Notice of all 
continuances must be given to the defendant. Notice of a 
continuance may be given in person, by telephone, or by mail. 
The manner in which notice was effected shall be set fortth in 
the file. 
(b) Criminal cases that have been set for trial or hearing 
shall not be continued or reassigned except upon order of the 
court. 
DISCIPLINARY RULE 7-101 - Representing a Client Zealously 
(A) A lawyer shall not intentionally: 
(1) Fail to seek the lawful objectives of his client 
through reasonably available means permitted by law and the 
Disciplinary Rules, except as provided by DR 7-10KB). A lciwyer 
does not violate this Disciplinary Rule, however, by acceding to 
reasonable requests of opposing counsel which do not prejudice 
the rights of his client, by being punctual in fulfilling all 
professional commitments, by avoiding offensive tactics, or by 
treating with courtesy and consideration all persons involved in 
the legal process. 
(2) Fail to carry out a contract of employment entered 
into with a client for professional services, but he may withdraw 
as permitted under DR 2-110, DR 5-102, and DR 5-105. 
(3) Prejudice or damage his client during the course 
of the professional relationship except as required under DR 7-
102(B). 
(B) In his representation of a client, a lawyer may: 
(1) Where permissible, exercise his professional 
judgment to waive or fail to assert a right or posittion of his 
cliient. 
(2) Refuse to aid or participate in conduct that he 
believes to be unlawful, even though there is some support for an 
argument that the conduct is legal. 
